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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE ESTATE OF PAUL STEED,
through its administratrix
MARY KAZAN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
NEW ESCALANTE IRRIGATION
COMPANY,
Defendant/Respondent.
Defendant/Respondent

:
:
:
:

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF
TO APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARING

:
:
:
:

Case No

890426

:
(defendant) submi|ts this brief at the

invitation of the Court and in response to plaintiff's Petition for
Rehearing.
The Petition presents nothing new. Plaidtiff chooses to ignore
the findings of the trial court and it c|hooses to ignore the
substantial body of law from this Court that clearly cuts against
plaintiff's position. All the Petition does is re-hash plaintiff's
arguments made on appeal, which both the tri^l court and this Court
unequivocally rejected.
The primary issue is whether or not uncler the facts as found
by the trial court, plaintiff has a vested right in defendant's
waste water such that it can require defendant to maintain the
historic level of waste water contribution tcf Alvey Wash. Utah law
is settled on this issue, and this Court h^s uniformly resolved
this issue against plaintiff's position.
Plaintiff simply does not like that Result.

It therefore

argues that the Court should be more "enlightened." Plaintiff says

that an "enlightened" Court would disregard decades of wellreasoned precedent and impose an equitable remedy.

However, the

equity plaintiff seeks would be beneficial only to plaintiff.

It

would boot strap plaintiff's 1909 priority water right in the
erratic flows of Alvey Wash into a reliable water right in the
Escalante River with a priority equal to or superior to defendant's
1875 priority right in the Escalante River.

It would require

defendant to commit capacity in its pipelines in order to deliver
defendant's water to plaintiff, to the exclusion of defendant's
shareholders who paid for the system.

The water would have to be

carried in the pipeline, as that is the only way to get water to
Alvey Wash now that the historic ditches and canals have been
abandoned and replaced with the pressurized sprinkler system. That
would deprive defendant and its shareholders of the benefits of its
two million dollar investment in its sprinkler system. Plaintiff's
recommended solution would confer a substantially better water
right on plaintiff than it in fact owns, and better than it could
acquire under the appropriation doctrine as an appropriator of
waste water.
defendant.

Plaintiff would benefit, but at the sole expense of
Such a result would be most inequitable to defendant

and its shareholders.
Defendant has a legal right to conserve and more efficiently
utilize its water supply through the recapture and reuse of its
waste and seepage water.

As the Court noted in its opinion, the

conservation of water is not a new idea in the West.

Irrigators

have been constructing storage reservoirs since irrigation began in
2

order to conserve the early spring flows off mountain streams for
use later in the irrigation season.

Irrigators have lined their

canals and destroyed water loving vegetatioh along ditch banks to
minimize seepage losses.

This Court has consistently upheld the

right of the water user to do this.1 Irrigating with sprinkler
systems is neither a new idea or new technology.

Sprinkler

irrigation has been actively used in the West} for at least the past
30 years.

It is merely another form of conservation.

A closed

pipeline system reduces seepage and evaporation losses which occur
in open ditch conveyance systems. Defendant [has the legal right to
employ conservation measures that enable it tlo use water previously
lost to seepage and waste. This is in keeping with the established
public policy of this state.
Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, plaintiff is not a lower
water use on the same source of supply as aeiendant.
owns a water

Instead, it

right that has as its source of supply water

originating in a separate and distinct natu|ral drainage known as
Alvey Wash.

The Court found there to be |io natural connection

between the Alvey Wash and the Escalante Rilver above plaintiff's
point of diversion. Therefore, the only way Escalante River water
reaches plaintiff's land is for defendant to divert water from the
Escalante River under its rights; for the defendant to convey that
water

through

its

irrigation

system

to

the

lands

of

its

^iq Cottonwood Tanner Ditch v. Moyle, L09 Utah 213, 289 P.
116 (1930).
2

Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 23 Utah 2Jd 97, 458 P.2d 861,
863 (1969).
3

shareholders; and, for its shareholders to apply the water to their
lands, some of which drain toward the Alvey Wash.

The fact that

Alvey Wash is a tributary to the Escalante River is of absolutely
no consequence here, since the confluence of these streams is some
25 miles downstream and below defendant's point of diversion.
If plaintiff's land were located below the confluence of the
Escalante River and Alvey Wash and plaintiff's established point of
diversion were on the river, its source of supply would then be the
Escalante River and not Alvey Wash.

As an appropriator of water

from the same source as defendant, plaintiff would have a call on
all sources of supply up-stream from its point of diversion.
could

therefore

enjoin

changes

of

use

upstream

that

It

would

unreasonably interfere with its vested water rights.
That simply is not the case here. Plaintiff owns no water
rights that have their source of supply in the Escalante River.
Plaintiff's water source is Alvey Wash. The flow of Alvey Wash has
been augmented by the waste water seeping through the ground and
running off the land of defendant's shareholders into Alvey Wash.
This seepage and waste water is not part of the natural flows of
Alvey Wash but is water that has been artificially brought into
Alvey Wash drainage by the efforts and expenditures of defendant.
As such, plaintiff simply has no vested rights against defendant to
require the same level of waste water to Alvey Wash.

3

Colleqe Irr. Co. v. Logan River & Blacksmith Fork Irr. Co.,
780 P.2d 1241 (1989).
4

Plaintiff argues that the location of ^he point of diversion
should make no difference because Alvey W^sh and the Escalante
River are part of the same river system.

Plaintiff's observation

simply begs the question. All streams are tributary to some other
stream.

For example, the Escalante River ailid Alvey Wash are both

tributaries of the Colorado River.

However, that fact does not

entitle plaintiff to have water imported t0 Alvey Wash from the
Green River simply because they are part of the larger Colorado
River system.
Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, the location of the
point of diversion is a critical element o£ the water right, as
that defines the source or sources of supply upon which an
appropriator may rely in satisfaction of his vested right. The law
of prior appropriation does not and cannot t4ke Plaintiff's global
approach to this issue. Plaintiff nevertheless asks this Court to
ignore the source of supply component of plaintiff's water right
and in equity to shift its appropriated water right from the
ephemeral flows of Alvey Wash to the relative security of the
Escalante River and then require defendant to deliver that water to
plaintiff through defendant's irrigation system. Such a rule would
erode the foundational under-pinnings of the doctrin^ of prior appropriation.
Plaintiff perceives the Court's decision to be harsh, but the
rule is no more harsh than the doctrine of prior appropriation
itself.

The doctrine is not one of equity.

It is a doctrine of

property rights, and its guiding principle id first in time, first
in right.

That principle assures those who are first in time that
5

they

may

satisfy

their

rights

in

full

before

subsequent

appropriators may divert any water in satisfaction of their junior
rights.

In times of shortage, the junior appropriator may get

nothing at all. That may not be equitable, but that is the nature
of the water right the junior appropriator acquired.

A junior

appropriator cannot invoke equity to force a senior appropriator to
share water with him during shortages any more than Plaintiff
should be able to invoke equity to force defendant to continue
making waste water available to plaintiff in Alvey Wash.
Plaintiff has used defendant's waste and seepage water while
it was available to plaintiff, and it has reappropriated this
water.

Plaintiff has acquired a vested right as against other

water users of Alvey Wash. However, plaintiff's appropriated right
in this waste water is not like a normal appropriated water right,
in that it does not give plaintiff a vested right against defendant
to compel defendant to continue wasting water for plaintiff's
benefit.4

Plaintiff does have a decreed water right in Alvey Wash

but like the decree involved in Lasson v. Seeley,5 the decree does

4

Hutchins, The Law of Water Rights, pp. 362-368, wherein he
states that where the waste water goes to another channel it is
open to reappropriation:
These waste-water appropriations, however, are not vested with
all the attributes of a true appropriative right, for it appears
to be settled that the waste-water claimant does not thereby
acquire, solely by virtue of such appropriation, a vested right
as against the original appropriator to have the practice of
wasting water for his particular benefit continue. . . . "
(emphasis added).
5

120 Utah 679, 238 P.2d 4185, 422-23, (1951).

not compel defendant to waste water to Alvey Wash in satisfaction
of plaintiff's water rights.
Still plaintiff argues that the waste ^na seepage water cases
are "old" law.

It contends the court should abandon this "old"

precedent and find a more "enlightened," Equitable remedy.

The

"old" law is squarely on point with the facts in this case and it
is the controlling law.

Further, this fold" rule of law is

actively being applied throughout the West even today,6 in cases
that address the efforts of upstream appropriators to conserve
water by implementing conservation measures
Plaintiff is not a lower user of water from the same stream as
defendant, but is instead the reappropriator of defendant's waste
and seepage water that artificially reaches Alvey Wash. Under the
controlling rule of law, plaintiff has acquired no vested right as
against defendant, by appropriation, by adverse use, or otherwise,
to compel defendant or its shareholders, to continue to let the
same amount of waste water run off or seep and percolate through
the ground water table from their lands into Alvey Wash for
plaintiff's benefit.7 Defendant has the legal right to use its
water more efficiently.

If that effort deprives plaintiff of some

of the water it has used in the past that is unfortunate, but

6

e.q. Department of Ecology v. U. S. Bureau of Reclamation,
827 P.2d 275 (Wash. 1992); Arizona Public Service Co. v. Long,
160 Ariz. 429, 773 P.2d 988 (1989); Hidden Springs Trout Ranch,
Inc. v. Hagerman Water Users, Inc., 101 Id. 617, 619 P.2d 1130
(1980).
7

East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co.f2 Utah 2d 170, 271
P.2d 449 (1954).
"~
7

plaintiff has no legal right to complain, for such is the nature of
a re-appropriator's interest in the waste and seepage water of
another.
Plaintiff

nevertheless contends that since the sprinkler

irrigation is more efficient, that there must be a "savings" of
water in which plaintiff, in equity, should be entitled to share.
Again, both the evidence and the trial Court's findings are to the
contrary.
The trial court found that a sprinkler system is approximately
25% more efficient than flood type irrigation. (Finding 21, R.
331). This finding was based on expert testimony.

Engineer Fred

Duberow testified that the sprinkler system does not make water,
but because of the more efficient application of the water, the
crops consume more. With flood-type irrigation the plants at the
upper end are over-watered, and the lower areas are under-watered.
Sprinklers provide for a more even application so that all crops
are watered uniformly.
water.

This results in better utilization of the

There is less waste because the once under-watered plants

now consume what they need.
Plaintiff

implies

that the conversion

to sprinklers has

resulted in 100% of the water diverted by the defendant being
consumed.

This is surely not the case.

The court found that

sprinklers are only 25% more efficient, not 100% more efficient
than flood irrigation. Therefore, some of the water applied to the
land still is unconsumed and would find its way to Alvey Wash from
those lands that drain that direction.
8

Plaintiff then argues that since there has been a savings of
water, defendant must have used this "savied" water to make an
unauthorized

expansion of its irrigated acreage.

Once again

neither the evidence, nor the trial Court's findings, support
plaintiff's assertions.

The Court found that after 1952 the

defendant filed and perfected new applicatioris to appropriate water
from the Escalante River. At the time of trial, defendant had the
right to irrigate up to 2,712.28 acres under its various perfected
water rights in the river. The trial Court ^lso found that at the
time of trial defendant Irrigation Company wa^s irrigating less than
2,700 acres.

Thus, contrary to plaintiff's assertions, defendant

is operating well within its water rights.
Plaintiff

then

argues

that

this

Court

threw

out

the

distinction between the return of water to th^ stream from which it
was diverted, as opposed to the flow of seepage or waste water to
a foreign drainage in its decision in Ea^t Bench Irr. Co. v.
Deseret Irr. Co.,.8

In this regard, plaintmi simply misreads the

decision, for the Court clearly preserved thi^ critical distinction
in the law.
In East Bench, the upstream appropriato^s had filed a change
application to change their points of diversion to move their
direct flow rights in the river into storage

The Court cited the

waste water cases9 that were being relied on by the upstream
8

2 Utah 2d 170, 271 P.2d 449 (1954).

9

Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. ^s. Union Central
Life Insurance Co., et al., 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866 (1943),
and 113 Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249 (1948), Lassofr v. Seeley, 120 Utah
9

appropriators in support of their contention that they had the
right to completely consume all of the water they diverted by using
it over and over again.
The Court in East Bench distinguished the waste water cases
from the situation then before the Court by noting that they did
not involve the rights of upper and lower water users on the same
natural stream.

Said the Court:

There [where the waste water did not return to the
stream from which it was diverted] the waters in question
were originally diverted by an upper canal company and
reached the lower users' lands only through that means
after they had been abandoned but before they had reached
the stream from which they were originally diverted. It
is generally recognized that such lower user, even though
he may by appropriation acquire the right to use such
waters as reach his lands from such source, either
directly from the higher lands or through a natural water
channel, [which would include the ground water table] can
acquire no right to have the upper user divert and bring
such water onto the upper user's land from where it will
become available for the irrigation of the lower user's
land before it reaches the stream from which it was
originally diverted. The upper user in such case owed the
lower user no obligation to bring such water to him; he
could abandon the diversion from the stream altogether
and thereby deprive the lower user of all of such waste
or surplus water. Under such conditions the lower user
can acquire no vested right against the upper user who
first diverted the water from the natural stream and
brought it to him either by appropriation, adverse user,
estoppel, acquiescence or other means, to compel him to
continue such practice. But a lower user of the water of
a [same] natural stream [or source of supply], as we have
seen, acquires a vested right as against all upper users
[of water in the same water source] that they shall not
increase the amount of water consumed after he makes his
appropriation by a change of place of diversion or place
or manner of use and thereby deprive him of the use of
such water, (emphasis added)

679, 238 P.2d 418 (1951),and McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394,
242 P.2d 570 (1952).
10

This rule is consistent with a long line of cases from this Court
and the many treatises upon which this Coiiirt has relied on and
quoted at length in its numerous opinions.10
Plaintiff

also contends that neither* the McNaughton11 or

Stubbs12 cases support the decision of the Cckirt.
misreads these cases.

In McNaughton ther£ was a natural wash

adjacent to irrigated land.
natural sources.

Plaintiff again

Some water accumulated therein from

Sometimes excess water (ekcess to the needs of

the shareholders) was diverted by the canal company from other
sources under its rights, and this exces$ water was released
directly into the natural wash.

Also, wfcste water which had

previously been used to irrigate lands

on bpth sides of the wash

drained into the wash above plaintiff's poiht of diversion.

The

Court squarely held that all three of these water sources (the
natural flows, the excess water and the wastte water) were subject
to reappropriation from the wash, again citing, with approval, the
above discussion by Hutchins.13
re-appropriator

acquired

no

The Court then held that the

right

as

10

against

the

original

Garns v. Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 P. 1867 (1912);
Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. vs. Union Central Life
Insurance Co., et al., 105 Utah 468, 142 P.2d 866 (1943),
rehearing, 113 Utah 356, 195 P.2d 249 (1948), Lasson v. Seeley,
120 Utah 679, 238 P.2d 418 (1951); and McNaughton v. Eaton, 121
Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570 (1952); Hutchins, The] Law of Water Rights.
362-368; See also Samuel Weil, Water Rights in the Western
f
States,, 3d ed. p. 50.(1905).
n

121 Utah 394, 242 P.2d 570 (1952).

12

13 Utah 2d. 45, 368 P.2d 461 (1962).
Supra. note 4.
11

appropriator to have the waste water continue to escape to the
wash. The issue was also presented in Stubbs v. Ercanbrack,14 where
the Court stated that:
...the waters produced in these drains are not waste waters as
referred to in the usual sense, nor did the trial Court find
them to be such. It did find that they resulted both from the
irrigation of the defendant's higher ground and from the
underlying water table. We are quite in harmony with the idea
that water rights could not be acquired in waste water so that
the defendant would be obliged to continue to irrigate his
higher ground to provide water to be collected in the
plaintiffs' drains. . . . (Emphasis added)
Thus, this Court has held in an unbroken line of cases
starting with Gams v. Rollins,15 in 1912, that the party who
diverts and uses seepage and waste water that has artificially been
introduced into his water shed above his point of diversion, may
use and even reappropriate this waste water.

However, that

re-appropriator acquires no vested rights against the original
appropriator of this waste or seepage water so as to compel the
upstream appropriator to continue to waste this water for his
benefit.
West.

This is the established law in Utah and throughout the

It is a rule of law based upon the origin or the source of

supply of water that is naturally available to an appropriator at
his or her established point of diversion.

It is a rule of law

that makes sense and should not be disturbed by the arbitrary
application of equity.
Plaintiff asserts yet again that defendant should have filed
a change application to convert from flood irrigation to sprinkler
14

13 Utah 2d. 45, 50, 368 P.2d 461 (1962).

15

41 Utah 260, 125 P. 867 (1912).
12

irrigation.
appropriation

That is not the law in Utah, nor in any other
doctrine

state.

The

first

change

application

legislation was enacted in 1903 as a part of the original water
code. Although the statute has been amended from time to time, it
has required the filing of a change application in only three
specified situations: (1) Where there is a change in point of
diversion from the source of supply where the water right was
established; (2) where there is a change in place of use; and (3)
where there is a change in purpose of use. Plaintiff cites no case
in Utah, or cases from any other jurisdiction holding that a change
application is necessary to convert an irrigation practice from
flood type irrigation to a sprinkling system.

We could not find

one either. The Court can take judicial noticte of the fact that the
application of water by a sprinkler system is decades old and is a
widely used practice in the State and throughout the West.

The

fact that there have been no cases requiring a change application
upon making this conversion is significant.
The courts have also held that administrative interpretations
of a statute by the agency charged with administering the statute
is entitled to significant weight.16

Further, this Court has held

that Courts can take judicial notice of the records of the State

16

Central Bank and Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 497 P.2d 638
(Utah 1972); R.S. McKniqht v. St. Land Board, 381 P.2d 726 (Utah
1963); Hotel Utah v. Industrial Commission, ill P.2d 200 (Utah
1949); See also, Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchel,
645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1982). See also, Lewis v. Martin, 397
U.S. 552, 90 S.Ct. 1282, 25 L. Ed.2d 561 (1970); New York State
Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 412 U.S. 405, 93 S.Ct. 2507,
37 L. Ed.2d 688 (1973).
13

Engineer, even though not introduced in evidence.

The change

application form in current use by the State Engineer's office in
paragraph 11, calls for information regarding the "purpose and
extent of use."

The purposes are listed as those recognized

beneficial uses of water: Irrigation, stock watering, domestic,
municipal, mining, power and other.

We submit that irrigation is

the purpose, nature or manner of use and that "purpose" of use is
not changed when an irrigator converts from flood-type irrigation
to the application of irrigation water through a pressurized
sprinkler system.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is not a lower water user from the same source of
supply as defendant, but is instead the user and re-appropriator of
defendant's waste and seepage water.

Waste water may be re-

appropriated before it has returned to the stream from which it was
originally diverted, and plaintiff can acquire a vested right as
against those other water users of Alvey Wash. However, plaintiff
can acquire no vested right as against the original appropriator so
as to compel

defendant

plaintiff's benefit.

to continue to waste this water

for

The law in Utah has been settled to this

effect for 80 years and plaintiff offers no compelling reason for
the Court to abandon this rule of law now.
The conservation of water is not a new idea, and sprinkler
irrigation is not a new technology that requires the wholesale

Lehi Irr. Co. v. Jones, 115 Utah 136, 202 P.2d 892 (1949);
and McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948).
14

abandonment of 80 years of established prededent.
conserve water and are more efficient.

Sprinklers do

water users should be

encouraged and rewarded for conservation by jretaining the right to
reuse their waste water.

That is the incest-ive required to make

the substantial investment in conservation.

To deprive defendant

of the benefits of its efforts and expenditures would destroy any
incentive to conserve and to make more efficient use of our scarce
water supplies.

It would be contrary to the public interest and

the established public policy of this State,
The trial court ruled correctly and thi£ Court was correct in
affirming the trial court's decision.

Plaintiff has presented

nothing new that would warrant the rehearing Df this matter or the
reconsideration of the Court's opinion.
This matter is respectfully subpiit^fecfl this

day of

November, 1992.
Stevei^
CLYDE PRATT & f3NOW
Attorneys for New Escalante
Irrigation Company
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